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Introduction
It is noteworthy that due to the limited scope of the paper, most value-related problems will 
only be mentioned briefly because they were discussed rather extensively in other papers 
(Kanišauskas, 2014a, 2014b). The same applies to the problems of value-related creativity 
and creative technologies (Kanišauskas, 2012a, 2016). Also, it is worth mentioning that there 
are at least four hierarchically subordinated levels in creative processes (Kanišauskas, 2011). 
This paper focuses only on one of it, which is considered as a “normal creative process”: 
redoing and recreating something by attributing absolutely new (not existent before) ele-
ments. It is worrying that these novel elements have been depreciating both the creative 
process (Kačerauskas, 2014) and value orientation (Pruskus, 2013a) in present multicultural 
postmodern society. However, these processes can be seen as related to ontological concern 
and creative need to transcend to the depth of the phenomena.
Though values in the sense of moral wealth have been widely discussed since the times 
of antiquity, the concept of value in the sense of how much something is worth started to be 
used only in the middle of the 19th century. At that time, the first value theories appeared 
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and, at the beginning of the 20th century, they acquired the name of axiology1. Today their 
taxonomy is grounded on the philosophical ideas they follow. Traditionally, six historically-
grounded types have been distinguished: naturalistic psychologism, transcendentalism, per-
sonal ontology, cultural and historical relativism, sociologism and religious approach. The 
latter grounding of values is related to Christian heritage of the European culture. 
At the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, the scholars of axi-
ology looked back into Aristotle’s ethics of virtue by relating it to creativity and expedience 
of human activities and pursuit for happiness (Boongaling, 2016; Pruskus, 2016). Thus, the 
theories of economics of happiness, seeking to establish social welfare (happiness), and new 
public management have emerged (Raipa, 2016; Guogis, 2011). The latter theory is oriented 
towards organizational culture, which should be based on the aggregate of widely spread 
basic values or at least on values, attitudes and norms which make the members of an or-
ganization one unit and allow implementing its aims and objectives (Patapas & Labenskytė, 
2011). Although both management strategies stand out as rather different, their aim is the 
same: to create the welfare state, which ensures the happiness of a human being and the 
society. In this way, the issues of values have become the focus of political, social, economic 
and legal discourses2. 
Inevitably, the problem of values commands Lithuanian scholars’ attention. Recently, 
the following scholars have attempted to tackle the issues of values in their papers and 
monographs: Vanda Aramavičiūtė (2005), Tomas Berkmanas and Edita Gruodytė (2014), 
Andrius Bielskis (2014), Saulius Kanišauskas (2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2013a, 2013b, 2014a, 
2014b), Bronislavas Juozas Kuzmickas (2013), Vilmantė Liubinienė (2002), Algis Mickūnas 
(2012), Alfonsas Algimantas Mitrikas (2005), Aistė Noreikaitė and Alvydas Jokubaitis (2015), 
Aleksandras Patapas and Gitana Labenskytė (2011), Albinas Plėšnys (2016a, 2016b), Valdas 
Pruskus (2013a, 2013b, 2015, 2016), Alvydas Raipa (2016), Romanas Vasiliauskas (2005), etc.
These theoretical discussions are largely related to the already mentioned orientation to 
creativity and to values in development of the welfare state. Also, it is noteworthy that it has 
conquered the media and it has become the buzzword in almost every politician, economist, 
manager, artist’s speech. 
However, they do not overstep the boundaries of this word and only sometimes they add 
that they mean intrinsic values but not mention which exactly. If they specify them, it turns 
out that they are neither intrinsic nor systemic values necessary for management. They are 
instrumental values, which are only attributive and hardly place anyone under obligation. 
Therefore, such frequent and irresponsible usage of the word “value” becomes worrying. The 
question arises whether the values are being devaluated. What are the real and underlying 
reasons for the frequent and irresponsible usage of this word? Can the so-called econom-
ics of happiness make a person truly happy and creative? Thus, this paper aims to seek the 
answers to these questions. 
1 Synonymic usage of the terms of the value theory and axiology is sometimes questionable. Some analytical phi-
losophers argue that axiology is only part of the value theory, which is considered as independent and oriented to 
scientific cognition. 
2 If we look at the website bookzz.org (see bookzz.org, 2018), for example, we can find more than 500 publications 
of the last decade dedicated to the issues of values. At least 20 of them are official documents or proceedings of 
international conferences and symposiums. 
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The nature of the concept of values and its wide spectrum allow employing interdisciplin-
ary and transdisciplinary methodology. Therefore, along with philosophical argument, social 
and political issues will inevitably be addressed. It has to be admitted that due to the limited 
space of the paper, some problems will be briefly overviewed but not analysed in-depth. 
1. The problems of the usage of the term “value” in research
The problem of irresponsible and inarticulate usage of the word (or concept) “value” is first 
encountered when looking at the “value lists”. For example, the university study programmes 
of leadership provide lists containing about 57 values, which should be aspired if you want to 
become an effective leader (Clear, 2017). Moreover, Steve Pavlina (2004) provides a 418-value-
list. Interestingly, what does a politician, a civil servant or a businessman mean when they 
say that the activity of their political party, organization, business enterprise or corporation is 
based on values but not, for example, on acknowledgement, progress, adaptability, candour, 
care, devotion, volunteering, team work or expected revenue? The question is serious because 
the mentioned values, even the revenue, are included in the “lists of values”. These values are 
often explicitly declared in strategic documents. Every organization indicates their mission 
and vision along with the values they hold. The problem is that listing of the values does 
not have much in common with real practice, it is only used for creating a company’s image 
(Arimavičiūtė, 2005, pp. 105-119, 148-159). What are these “other”, “special” values they have 
in mind when they emphasize some kind of abstract values along with the concrete ones? 
This question will be addressed by providing an example of publicly accessible mission of 
Lithuanian National Radio and Television (LNRT) (lrt.lt, 2017). It enumerates the following 
values and moral principles: freedom of speech and ability to create, independence, impar-
tiality, consideration for public interest and values, moral principles. Logically, the question 
arises what other values are besides the freedom of speech and ability to create, indepen-
dence, etc., what moral principles they have in mind. Apparently, only the heads of LNRT can 
provide the answer. Or not. This is an example of increasing inarticulate and irresponsible 
talk about values in Lithuania. It is crucially important not to forget that language is not an 
instrument of reproduction of ideas but it has the power to influence and shape our mind, 
thinking and value attitudes (Pruskus, 2013a). This idea is supported by Steffen Roth (2013), 
who was investigating value orientations of corporations and business enterprises declared 
in their websites. He claims that most of them are copied from each other and the meaning 
of the declared values is scanty, not determined and not articulated. This leads to the idea 
that other countries face similar problems of values. 
Perhaps, it will be overstated to claim that this inarticulate and irresponsible usage of the 
term “values” made theoreticians work on the systematization of the term usage. The process 
of systematization started when different senses of the term “values” were not used in public 
discourses yet. The first investigations by Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, Alexius 
Meinong, Max Scheler, Karl Robert Eduard von Hartmann, Nicolai Hartmann and Max We-
ber were published around 1890–1920. Later Martin Heidegger’s, John Dewey’s and Abraham 
Maslow’s ideas and analytical and phenomenological approaches were particularly influential 
in developing value theories. Robert S. Hartman’s The Structure of Value: Foundations of 
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Scientific Axiology (1967) and “The Measurement of Value” (1973) became highly potent in 
systematization of values. These works following analytical tradition supplemented with phe-
nomenological insights consolidated the concepts of intrinsic, extrinsic and systemic values 
and became the beacons of scientific (or formal) axiology (Clear Direction, Inc., 2001; Smith, 
2014). However, systematization of values and their analysis were not the only focus of that 
time. There was a constant change and development of values and their evaluation (Clawson 
& Vinson, 1978; Kanišauskas, 2014b). It has to be admitted that special attention to values 
was devoted at the end of the 20th century. In 1981, a 9-year-long international programme 
of European Values Study (2015) was launched and more than 70 000 people of different 
nationalities and age groups participated in it by filling in a special questionnaire on values. 
This programme investigated the prevailing European life values. Also, it attempted to define 
the identity of Europe and its nations. Later, the programme extended to other countries and 
covered the periods of 1995–1998 and 1999–2001 (Mitrikas, 2005). Moreover, Liubinienė 
explored the change of values in the period when Lithuania was integrating into the Euro-
pean Union (2002). It is noteworthy that both sociological investigations were related to the 
quality of life as a possibility to choose an individual lifestyle and individual self-expression. 
This possibility was unequivocally related to the conception of the welfare state, which is 
grounded on liberal ideology. 
Most of the mentioned investigations were performed not within the framework of clas-
sical value theories, not even within the framework of rather influential formal (scientific) 
axiology, but they were based on rather Rokeach Value Survey (1973) controversial modifica-
tions (Clawson & Vinson, 1978). According to Milton Rokeach, terminal values are defined 
as the ones which a person adopts while pursuing the goals during their lifetime. Instru-
mental values are considered as personal abilities and talents, which allow achieving the 
goals. These definitions of terminal and instrumental values could be ascribed to the fields 
of philosophy and psychology if Rokeach had not presented a list of concrete terminal val-
ues such as a comfortable life, equality and equal opportunity for all, independence and free 
choice, physical and mental well-being, a world at peace and other. It is obvious that these 
concepts are integrally related to social and political philosophy but not to the problem of 
the meaning of life or psychology. Moreover, the definition of terminal values corresponds 
to instrumental values, which help accomplish life goals (being ambitious, competent, cou-
rageous, intellectual, responsible, loving, etc.). This substantial disagreement between the 
definition of terminal values and their specific manifestation is quite symptomatic. It shows a 
rather radical process of overestimation of values, which started in the 1960s. If classical value 
theories underlined moral values, then, in the era of postmodern capitalism, which adopts 
the ideology of immanent consumption and satisfying needs and even “production of needs” 
(Clawson & Vinson, 1978; Rubavičius, 2010, pp. 34-39, 97-125), instrumental values are 
likely to be prioritized. Liubinienė (2002), following the prominent scholar Ronald Inglehart 
who investigated values of modernism and postmodernism, names this era as “postmaterial-
ism”. For example, she presents such values as self-discipline, social justice, friend-oriented 
social life and wealth and contends that they are not intrinsic values, they are only measures 
or instruments to satisfy our higher level needs. 
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While discussing the findings of her research, Liubinienė (2002) underlines thather re-
search is grounded on Shalom H. Schwartz’s methodology, which might be considered as a 
modification of Rokeach’s theory. Both Rokeach and Schwartz claim that values, which are 
related to activity motivating desirable goals, become evaluation criteria of human activities 
(Plėšnys, 2016b). Schwartz maintains that goal-oriented values are basic and universal. Ac-
cording to him, basic values are the ones which are recognized in every culture (thus, they 
are universal) and which motivate human behaviour and become goal-oriented (Schwartz, 
2012). Although the scholar admits that individuals and social groups have different and 
constantly changing systems of values and that a large part of values comes in conflict or are 
hardly compatible3, he is convinced that his circular model of values constitutes universal a 
continuum of human motivations and it justifies universality of vital and other values.
However, a number of contemporary scholars disagree with Schwartz’s ideas. At the end 
of the 20th century, a new postmodern thinking emerged and started to dominate the world. 
It utterly rejected any ideas of totality, generality and universality and it denied expedience 
existing in social sciences. On the contrary, it foregrounds diversity and its fragmentation, 
locality of events and even chaos. This thinking consolidated relativistic notion of value plu-
ralism. Another version of cultural and historical value pluralism has remained immensely 
influential. According to it, moral norms and values depend on cultural and historical con-
text; therefore, there are many equivalent (or at least irreducible to each other) value systems. 
This version finds its roots in culture studies based on historical insights (Kuzmickas, 2013, 
pp. 122-144). Even those contemporary scholars who reject relativistic attitude to values, 
have serious doubts about validity of Schwartz’s arguments and pose a question whether 
universality is only assumed because some values are being protected on purpose by nam-
ing them as absolute, intrinsic, inherent, etc. (Baron & Ritov, 2009). According to Jonathan 
Baron and Ilana Ritov (2009), the reasons for protecting “intrinsic” or “absolute” values lie in 
the attempt to differentiate the values identified with classical moral wealth from the values 
formed by business relationship and the culture of consumption and need satisfying. These 
scholars evaluate the attempt to differentiate the values in this way negatively. They maintain 
that moral choices and solutions should be determined by other alternatives, but not the 
abstract virtues though fundamental. Baron and Ritov present the findings of a sociological 
research, which illustrate that 22% of respondents would completely ban cloning or gene 
modification despite the fact how good the outcomes are. However, these respondents were 
absolutely convinced that this solution should be supported by all people. It is concluded 
that this minority of people would like to impose their moral convictions on the majority of 
people, not taking into consideration whether the majority supports it or does not. This is 
an essential disadvantage of deontological intuitions. As the scholars point out, teleological 
principal underlying utilitarianism is questionable because if we consider what is the most 
useful for the majority of people as the goal of activities, we will always face hardships in 
public politics: it is impossible to measure what is the most beneficial for the biggest number 
of people. Apparently, the scholars are against Schwarz’s protected expedience and universal-
ity of values. 
3 For example, personal achievement is hardly compatible with benevolence towards another person. However, 
success and benevolence are considered as universal values. 
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Stanley Riukas (1998), having analysed Aristotle’s attitude to the dynamics of virtues and 
happiness, arrived at the conclusion that it is incorrect to contrast deontological and teleo-
logical attitudes towards values. He draws attention to the fact that in practice deontology-
based intrinsic values often turn to teleology-based instrumental (goal-oriented) values and 
vice versa. Also, he points out that in the hierarchy of values, higher level values may become 
lower level values and vice versa. He describes the dynamics of values as reversibility of them 
and inability to understand this leads to relativistic conception of values. 
Thus, it leads to a tentative conclusion that the reasons for irresponsible, inarticulate and 
excess usage of the term “value” are inevitably linked to scarcity of unambiguous answer to 
the question what contemporary values exist in real life and what their underlying principle 
is. Also, it has to be admitted that dominating relativistic conception of values and protection 
of them have a significant impact in contemporary society. 
This conclusion however does not provide an answer why the term of “values” is so widely 
and frequently (and irresponsibly) used nowadays. On the one hand, we can accuse politi-
cians, economists, artists and other people who discuss values in public discourses of not 
being familiarized with the principles of classical axiology4 and thus their terminology is not 
articulated properly and irresponsible. On the other hand, it may account for their ignorance 
but it does not explain their hypertrophied attention to values. 
2. Ontological scarcity and deontological longing
The reference to the posed question can be found in the theory of basic values suggested by 
Schwartz’s (2012). While writing about the nature of values, he underlined that values are 
beliefs related to inextricable questions and to unsatisfied action motivating needs. More-
over, having presented a list of basic values, he admitted that spirituality, which he earlier 
considered as a basic value, was removed from the list because in different cultures it is com-
prehended in different ways. Thus, though he points out that this concept is not universal5, 
he is positive that in most societies spirituality is acknowledged as one of the highest values 
up to now. 
Maslow’s ideas were influential in shaping the attitude that values arise out of needs and 
this is hardly questioned nowadays (Kuzmickas, 2013, pp. 8-11). In literature, fundamental 
needs such as vitality and security and such intrinsic needs for love, dependence, respect, 
self-actualization and sometimes transcendental needs are highlighted. The first group of 
fundamental needs (vitality and security) determines such values as life, health, security, plea-
sure, happiness, success, material wealth and others. The second group of intrinsic needs is 
related to ethical, aesthetical, religious and transcendental values. Also, excess values should 
be pinpointed. They arise from artificially formed excess needs, which can be described as 
protected values. They have existed in all times but particularly they started to flourish in the 
context of economics of happiness based on neoliberal ideology. It has to be admitted that not 
only excess values are protected but also the last decades witnessed the protection of vitality 
4 At least Lithuanian universities do not offer such study subjects as axiology or value theory. 
5 Alfonsas Vaišvila (2004) indicates that there are at least four historically grounded conceptions of spirituality: 
biological, logical, psychological and cultural. 
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and security needs. It should not be wondered because, as Algirdas Degutis (2010) points out, 
nowadays the neoliberal ideology prevails in the Western world and surprisingly it is closely 
related to the resurgent Marxist ideology. The essence of the ideology lies in the idea that the 
most important need of the human being and society is to satisfy their needs for material 
wealth. Moreover, this ideology gives prominence to abstract ideas treating them as if they 
had an independent ontological status and it manifests through deeply rooted and protected 
values (Bielskis, 2014, pp. 34, 44). The scarcity of material wealth and unequal sharing of it 
becomes the source of social tensions and conflicts. Thus, it is not surprising that the pro-
tected vision of welfare state and economics of happiness places a high value on relating the 
human and societal happiness to satisfying the need of material wealth and its fair distribu-
tion. By contrast, theoretical approaches, as it was mentioned previously, encourage turning 
back to Aristotelian understanding of happiness (eudemonia), which highlights “the activity 
of reason in accordance with virtue in a complete life” (Riukas, 1998). Alas, neither politi-
cians nor economists take into consideration this suggestion. They should do this because 
the ideology of economics of happiness faces a serious issue whether it is fair. Sociological 
research has shown that the rise of income of people living in poverty (i.e. satisfying material 
needs) increases their satisfaction in life (it increases their “happiness”). This happens just to 
a certain extent. When the income reaches a particular level (when it reaches an average in-
come of developed countries), the further income increase does not affect satisfaction in life 
(“happiness”) significantly. This rather strange link between happiness and income increase 
was called the Easterlin paradox (Navaitis & Gaidys, 2016). Therefore, it is legitimate to ask 
whether such protected values as material wealth with its happiness, success, benefit, etc. are 
really the most important for the human being. It is legitimate to ask whether the scarcity of 
satisfaction of fundamental needs leads to disappointment with life, the loss of the meaning 
of life and depression. 
The term “scarcity” was not used incidentally. It takes us back to the previously men-
tioned Schwartz’s idea that values are related to unsatisfied needs, that is the scarcity of 
health, security, pleasure, success, material wealth and other. But does the human being feel 
the lack only of these values? What about such values as attention, friendliness, love, respect, 
generosity, the sublime, fairness, etc.? Finally, do not we feel the lack of what Maslow called 
transcendental needs? 
These questions might be regarded as rhetorical if not a study published by Lithuanian 
Culture Research Institute in 2016. The authors of the study The Phenomenon of Scarcity: 
Being, Man and Society (Leontjeva, Vainė, & Vyšniauskaitė, 2016) are economists, managers, 
political scientists, sociologists, psychologists, philosophers and the clergy. They introduce 
the findings of the several-year project. The fact that the study was initiated by Lithuanian 
Free Market Institute, spreading and defending the ideas of liberalism and libertarianism, is 
worth taking into consideration. The phenomenon of scarcity of material values has become 
the basis of many economic theories (Šilėnas & Žukauskas, 2016). But the study showed 
that if we want to implement the economics of happiness and solve the Easterline paradox, 
we also lack other things. We feel scarcity of such wealth, which was mentioned by Aristotle 
and later developed by Thomas Aquinas in the Christian context. It is very important that 
quite often the concept of “scarcity” is understood in its negative sense, while it should be 
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comprehended as seeking and longing for the good to acquire, that is the things we desper-
ately need (Plėšnys, 2016a). 
I would argue that this understanding of the concept of “scarcity” explains the Easterline 
paradox and irresponsible and inarticulate usage of the term “value”. In the process of diminish-
ing the scarcity of material values, that is when the most vital needs are satisfied and physical 
security is ensured, the other needs do not disappear. These needs underlie the values ascribed 
to the domain of intrinsic, spiritual values in axiology. If politicians do not name the values 
they write or speak about, it happens because of two reasons. The first reason has already been 
mentioned – the lack of philosophical education and awareness. The second reason is far more 
serious. Almost all people feel that the values of spiritual character do exist. But not all people 
dare admit this openly. If Schwartz, being a theoretician, was making excuses about the con-
cept of spirituality not being universal, then not surprisingly the concepts of spirituality and 
transcendentalism are likely to be avoided in public secular discourses. It happens because the 
concepts have little in common with perceptual reality and, thus, they are pointless or they are 
related to religious beliefs, which might be unacceptable for a large part of the society. 
The dissociation from spiritual values connected with transcendentalism does not mean 
that they do not exist. It has been mentioned that the conception of spiritual in the sense 
(“pajauta”) of Numinosum is inseparable from deep respect toward transcendence, which 
might evoke both terror and fascination, and toward living beings, life, ground, grass, ani-
mals, people, that is the nature (Kanišauskas, 2013a). I have used the Lithuanian word “pa-
jauta”, which is problematic or even impossible to translate, not accidentally. This concept 
belonging to the field of aesthetics is defined as experiencing something significant and 
meaningful, and it manifests through emotions, imagination, associations and even extra-
sensory feelings (Mureika, 2016, pp. 62, 137-159). I would call it intuitive insight, whereas 
Povilas Aleksandravičius (2015, pp. 11, 25-29) names it as a transcendental movement to the 
depth. This transcendence is not necessarily overstepping a line between the material and 
the ideal, what ordinary people call as earthly and divine. Both Aleksandravičius (2015, p. 
6) and Bielskis (2014, pp. 79-86) point out that it can also be understood as overstepping the 
line between I and the Other, or in other words, it is a metaphysical transgression of one’s 
limits. Admittedly, Bielskis relates the longing for metaphysical transgression to Emmanuel 
Lévinas’ secular conception of consciousness, though Levinas (1994, p. 14) claimed that his 
original conception of transcendence was related to Biblical texts. But the most important is 
that the needs can be satisfied while metaphysical longing is impossible to satisfy due to its 
nature: we can only feel it, its object is implied and inarticulate but not rationally defined. 
It does not matter that the object is related to the immanent intuitive insight (“pajauta”) of 
Numinosum or to transcendental movement to the depth wishing I and the Other to merge, 
to melt into each other, in other words, to unite. It is important that this metaphysical wish 
which can be called as ontological longing really exists and it inevitably leads to the vague 
and inarticulate usage of the term “values”. 
In other words, when we attempt to list all values related to the needs, some values will 
always remain overlooked, because it is impossible to explicate what is only felt, what is implied 
and what is a secular or religious metaphysical longing. In axiology, they are called instrumen-
tally indeterminate universal intrinsic values. What they have in common is that they describe 
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not what is, was or will be but what should be respected and valued and even what must be 
(Kuzmickas, 2013, p. 12). Therefore, when a politician, economist, clergyman or journalist says 
the word “values”, not explicating what values they have in mind, we should understand that 
they mean what I have called the existential, ontological longing for what should or must be. 
Conclusions
The reflections on the value problem lead to the conclusion that there are the certain reasons 
for the excess, irresponsible, inarticulate usage of the term “values”. The first reason is the 
scarcity of an unambiguous answer to the question what contemporary values are in real-
ity. Next, the presently dominating relativistic conception of values and often illegitimate 
protection of some values has a huge impact on such use of the term. Also, lack of adequate 
philosophical education and awareness play a significant role. Having taken everything into 
consideration, it should be pointed out that the principal reason for it is unconscious longing 
for what should and must be.
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Pastaraisiais dešimtmečiais su gerovės valstybe ir laimės ekonomika siejamas smark-
iai išaugęs visuomenės dėmesys vertybėms ima kelti nerimą. Terminas vertybė 
viešuosiuose ir net kūrybiniuose diskursuose pradėtas vartoti neartikuliuotai, neat-
sakingai. Todėl kyla klausimas  – ar neprasidėjo vertybių devalvacijos procesas? 
Straipsnyje apžvelgiamos šiuolaikinių vertybinių tyrimų tendencijos ir parodoma, 
kad dėmesys vertybėms kyla ne tik dėl vis dar esančios materialių poreikių paten-
kinimo stokos, bet ir dėl neįsisąmoninto kūrybinio poreikio transcendentuoti į gylį, 
ontologinio ilgesio to, kas iš tiesų yra tikra. 
Reikšminiai žodžiai: kūrybiškumas, laimės ekonomika, stoka, dvasingumas, vertybės, 
dorybės. 
